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 LAW SUMMARY 
Copyright Protection: The Force Could Not 
Keep Han Solo Alive, but Can It Protect Him 
from Authors’ Derivative Works? 
MICAH UPTEGROVE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past century, fictional characters have become extremely valu-
able; the Harry Potter films all together, for example, grossed $7.7 billion at 
the box office.1  Even this huge sum is dwarfed by Marvel movies, which 
have brought in over $9 billion to date.2  While these newer characters are 
fascinating, the classics still live on; one of the most memorable fictional 
characters of all time is Mickey Mouse, who had his debut in 1928 as Steam-
boat Willie.3  In the past, Disney has worked diligently to protect its fictional 
characters, but copyright law does not offer perpetual protection.4  In fact, 
Steamboat Willie would have first entered the public domain in 1956, but 
because of Disney’s efforts, he is now protected until 2023.5 The reason for 
this extended protection is buried in several acts of Congress, including most 
recently the Mickey Mouse Protection Act or, officially, the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”).6  The CTEA is pejorative-
ly referred to as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act as a result of Disney’s 
extensive lobbying support designed to prevent its early works from entering 
 
* B.A., B.S.B.E., University of Missouri, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Mis-
souri School of Law, 2016; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  I 
am grateful to Professor Erika Lietzan for her feedback and invaluable encourage-
ment. 
 1. Oliver Gettell, J.K. Rowling’s New Harry Potter Story: Could It See the Big 
Screen?, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/
moviesnow/la-et-mn-jk-rowling-new-harry-potter-story-movie-20140708-story.html. 
 2. Rohan Patel, The Marvel Cinematic Universe Has Officially Grossed over $9 
Billion Worldwide, COMICBOOKMOVIE.COM (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://www.comicbookmovie.com/fansites/KingPatel/news/?a=126180. 
 3. Steamboat Willie, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0019422/ (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2016). 
 4. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
 5. See Beth Hutchens, Copyrights Last for a Limited Time, At Least in Theory, 
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/05/27/copyrights-
last-for-a-limited-time-at-least-in-theory/id=17391/.  See also Zachary Crockett, How 
Mickey Mouse Evades the Public Domain, PRICEONOMICS (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://priceonomics.com/how-mickey-mouse-evades-the-public-domain/. 
 6. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 287 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)). 
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the public domain.7  The late Sonny Bono introduced the CTEA, which ex-
tended copyright protection; his ultimate goal, however, was to extend copy-
right protection indefinitely.8  Unfortunately for Bono, the Constitution pro-
hibits perpetual copyright protection, a point his wife later conceded before 
the House of Representatives.9  The fact that these fictional characters are so 
valuable, however, incentivizes companies to try to protect their works in a 
variety of different ways. 
Going forward, we will likely see companies attempting to further ex-
tend the duration of copyright, but constitutional constraints will incentivize 
businesses to seek the protection of other areas of law, such as trademarks for 
their fictional characters.  In the future, we will likely see companies trying to 
further extend the duration of copyright, but we will also see different areas 
of law being applied to fictional characters.10  One possible example of this 
may be how Disney has incorporated Mickey Mouse.  Since Meet the Robin-
sons was released in 2007, Mickey Mouse has appeared at the beginning of 
every Walt Disney Animation Studios’ production.11  Disney including this 
short film before all of its new films may be in order to establish trademark 
protection for the clip.12 
There are several differences between the protection of graphical and 
literary characters, with those differences being especially profound when 
characters are created in one form of media but are then transferred to anoth-
er.13  A well-known example of this is the Harry Potter series, which consists 
of books that were then turned into movies.  What happens when a character 
in the books is a “flat” character that does not have anything more than a ge-
 
 7. See Daniel Tencer, ‘Mickey Mouse Protection Act’ Headed for Canada After 
Feds ‘Cave’ in Trade Talks: Reports, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (Feb. 7, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/02/07/mickey-mouse-protection-act_n_
6633502.html; Crockett, supra note 5. 
 8. 144 CONG. REC. H9951–52 (1998) (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Mary Bono). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Timothy B. Lee, 15 Years Ago, Congress Kept Mickey Mouse Out of the 
Public Domain. Will They Do It Again?, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/25/15-years-ago-
congress-kept-mickey-mouse-out-of-the-public-domain-will-they-do-it-again. 
 11. See Bill Desowitz, ‘Meet the Robinsons’: Keep Moving Forward at Disney, 
ANIMATION WORLD NETWORK (Mar. 30, 2007, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.awn.com/animationworld/meet-robinsons-keep-moving-forward-disney; 
Beth Barany, Trademark Protection for Fictional Characters, WRITER’S FUN ZONE 
(Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.writersfunzone.com/blog/2011/12/23/trademark-
protection-for-fictional-characters/.  The animation was modified to better fit the 
theme for Tangled, Frozen, and Wreck-It-Ralph but otherwise appeared unaltered.  
See TANGLED (Walt Disney Animation Studios 2010); WRECK-IT RALPH (Walt Dis-
ney Animation Studios 2012); FROZEN (Walt Disney Animation Studios 2013). 
 12. See Barany, supra note 11. 
 13. See Ivan Hoffman, The Protection of Fictional Characters, IVANHOFFMAN, 
http://www.ivanhoffman.com/characters.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
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neric personality but is transformed into a “round” character in the movie 
series?14  Does the copyright for this new complex character originate in the 
book or instead in the later film adaptation?15  These questions can also be 
resolved in different ways; notably there is also a difference in preventing 
someone from creating and selling copies of another’s work and giving 
someone the right to create derivative works. 
This Note is meant to address the issues surrounding the rights copyright 
holders have in their characters and what rights they should be given.  These 
existing rights are so valuable that it is likely that major companies such as 
Disney are going to continue to try to extend copyright duration; this method 
has worked repeatedly in the past to protect their fictional characters.16  The 
extension of copyright duration through statutes is an attempt to navigate the 
issue that the U.S. Constitution technically only allows for copyrights to be 
protected for a “limited time.”17  If companies such as Disney can get a copy-
right term extension every few decades, they will essentially have created de 
facto perpetual copyright duration without violating the language of the Con-
stitution.  The right to create derivative works is also protection given by 
copyright law and it may be far more valuable to authors who wish to pro-
duce their works in a series.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions in Warner 
Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. X One X Products and Klinger v. Conan Doyle 
Estate, however, seem to create a circuit split that complicates the issue of 
when other authors can begin to create derivative works.  With copyrights 
protecting such a valuable industry there are some who argue for copyright 
duration to be extended indefinitely,18 but there are also strong arguments 
against perpetual copyright duration premised on the relationship between 
copyright protection, competition, and creativity.19 
It is difficult to deny that copyright duration has an effect on creativity 
and competition, but as long as companies like Disney do not have an alterna-
tive method of protecting their fictional characters, they will continue to seek 
extended copyright duration.  This then raises a question: What is it that 
 
 14. How well developed a character is can be extremely important for copyright 
protection, but other terms such as “round” or “flat” are often used to describe the 
character’s complexity.  Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 501–02 
(7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458 (2014). 
 15. Hoffmann analyzes these questions, but unfortunately the answer is complex 
and very case specific.  See Hoffman, supra note 13. 
 16. See Lee, supra note 10. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 18. Mark Helprin, A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn’t Its Copyright?, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/opinion/20helprin.html?
ex=1337313600&en=3571064d77055f41&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=per
malink&_r=0. 
 19. Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict Competition and 
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companies like Disney are actually trying to protect, and is there some other 
way of protecting that interest without extending copyright protection?  This 
Note takes the stance that what authors want to protect is the right to the use 
of their fictional characters in derivative works, and they would be willing to 
forgo fighting for statutory copyright duration extensions in exchange for this 
right.  This stance is premised on the idea that copyright holders gain little 
income from their oldest works, such as the original Sherlock Holmes stories, 
but the right to create new movies and stories is extremely valuable. 
This Note looks to answer those questions and begins by analyzing the 
legal background of copyright protection in the United States in Part II.  This 
is important because copyright protection has changed greatly since the Con-
stitution was written, and it is possible that some of those changes have creat-
ed problems that now need to be addressed.  Part III discusses the recent de-
velopments in areas germane to copyright law as they pertain to fictional 
characters.  This includes issues concerning what it means to create a deriva-
tive work, the right of publicity as it relates to fictional characters, and the 
limitations of trademark protection for characters.  Part IV contains a discus-
sion analyzing the split in the federal district courts, along with unique chal-
lenges associated with corporations as authors and owners of copyrights.  Part 
IV concludes with a discussion of the constitutional limitations to copyright 
duration and proposed changes to copyright law. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part begins with an overview of the history of copyright law in the 
United States that, while not comprehensive, is intended to trace the devel-
opment of copyright law and its application to fictional characters.  It then 
describes how and when fictional characters are copyrightable in the first 
place, explores the concept of derivative work, and expands into a discussion 
of the right of publicity and its application to entities other than people.  This 
Part then concludes with an overview of trademark law and its relevance for 
fictional characters. 
A.  A Brief History of Copyright Law 
The United States has a long history of protecting copyrights, with the 
first copyright statute passed in Connecticut on January 29, 1783.20  The 1783 
statute provided the author of a book or pamphlet the exclusive right to print, 
publish, and vend the work in the state for a period of fourteen years from 
 
 20. Brian Lee Pelanda, Declarations of Cultural Independence: The National-
istic Imperative Behind the Passage of Early American Copyright Laws, 58 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 431, 441 (2011). 
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first publication.21  In 1788, the U.S. Constitution was ratified and authorized 
copyright legislation: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”22  Later, Congress passed the 
Copyright Act of 1790, which gave authors of maps, charts, and books the 
sole right to print, reprint, publish, and vend their works for fourteen years.23  
The author was required to apply for the copyright, and if they were still alive 
when the copyright was expiring, he or she could renew the copyright protec-
tion one time for an additional fourteen years, totaling twenty-eight years 
overall.24  The Copyright Act of 1909 then extended the duration to twenty-
eight years from the date of publication with the possibility of one renewal of 
the same duration for a total of fifty-six years.25 
The next major change came with the Copyright Act of 1976 (“Act”), 
which extended the copyright duration to the life of the author plus fifty 
years.26  Works for hire, anonymous works, and pseudonymous works were 
given a copyright term of seventy-five years.27  Works copyrighted before the 
promulgation of the Act that had not yet entered the public domain had their 
extension term expanded from twenty-eight years to forty-seven years, giving 
them an effective copyright term of seventy-five years.28  The Act also ex-
panded the subject matter of copyright, with Section 102 extending protection 
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, 
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine or device.”29  Qualifying works of authorship were expanded to include 
the following: literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, 
sculptural works along with motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and 
sound recordings.30  Section 106 granted authors the exclusive right to repro-
duce, distribute, perform, and display the works along with the right to create 
derivative works.31 
 
 21. Adam Barrett Townshend, Note, Crashing by Design: Toward a Uniform 
Standard for Public Place Analysis Under Federal Copyright Law, 79 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 2045, 2048 n.11 (2004). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 23. Ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-553, 90 Stat. 2541). 
 26. Copyright Act of 1976 § 302(a) (as originally enacted) (current version at 17 
U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012)). 
 27. Id. § 302(c). 
 28. Id. § 304(a). 
 29. Id. §102(a). 
 30. Id.  Architectural works were added to this section in 1990.  Architectural 
Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701–06, 104 Stat. 5133 
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 31. Copyright Act of 1976 § 106. 
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The (“CTEA”) further extended the copyright duration for new and ex-
isting works.32  Under the CTEA, works with known authors were protected 
for the life of the author plus seventy years.33  Works for hire, corporate 
works, anonymous works, and pseudonymous works were given protection 
for 120 years after creation, or ninety-five years after publication, whichever 
occurred earlier.34 
B.  Copyrighting Fictional Characters 
When movies or cartoons are given a copyright, a component of the 
copyright serves to protect characters that are sufficiently distinctive.35  Char-
acters that are not distinctive enough for copyright protection fall into the 
concept of “scènes à faire,”36 a legal doctrine that prevents an author from 
proving copyright infringement by pointing to elements in a work that are 
rudimentary or unavoidable given the nature of the work.37  Drunken bums, 
talking cats, fire-breathing dragons, and monocle-wearing Prussian officers 
that click their heels are all examples of stock characters that would fall under 
“scènes à faire.”38 
In Gaiman v. McFarlane, the issue regarding which characters are copy-
rightable was addressed in the context of comic books.39  McFarlane began 
publishing the Spawn comic book series in 1992 about the adventures of Al 
Simmons, who was deceased but returned to Earth as a Hellspawn.40  McFar-
lane hired several writers, including Gaiman, to improve the story line; 
throughout the process, Gaiman also created several new characters, includ-
ing Medieval Spawn and Count Nicholas Cogliostro.41  A confrontation de-
veloped, and in subsequent litigation, McFarlane made the argument that 
Medieval Spawn and Cogliostro were not copyrightable because they were 
too undeveloped.42   
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by 
examining the relevant characters and their similarities and differences.43  
The first character is the original Spawn who could be described as a malevo-
lent Superman figure that wears a huge red cape and armor created by a neu-
 
 32. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 287 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012)). 
 33. Id. § 302(a). 
 34. Id. § 302(c). 
 35. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 597 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
 36. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 37. Id. (quoting Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 38. Id. at 660. 
 39. Id. at 648. 
 40. Id. at 649. 
 41. Id. at 649–50. 
 42. Id. at 657. 
 43. Id. 
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ral parasite.44  The second relevant character is Medieval Spawn who rides a 
horse, wears armor that is similar to Spawn’s but it is illustrated to look more 
like a medieval suit of armor, and speaks in an antiquated form of English.45  
The third relevant character is Count Cogliostro, who is a wisdom-toting sage 
whose physical characteristics are well described with him appearing similar 
to a skinny, old bum with a greyish-yellow, Santa Clause-like beard.46 
The Seventh Circuit held that Cogliostro’s “age, obvious phony title 
(‘Count’), what he knows and says, his name, and his faintly Mosaic facial 
features combine to create a distinctive character.”47  The court noted that the 
case of Medieval Spawn appears to be a closer question because the character 
does not have a proper name; yet, the Lone Ranger is also distinctive and 
does not have a name, so the lack of name cannot be a characteristic that 
alone defeats copyright protection.48  The test was then whether Medieval 
Spawn was sufficiently different from the original Spawn to be independently 
copyrightable as a derivative work.49 
The court explained that there are two reasons why a derivative work is 
required to be significantly different from the original copyright in order to be 
copyrightable.50  The first is to avoid the confusion that would be generated 
“if two indistinguishable works were copyrighted.”51  The second is in order 
to prevent an author from “making an identical work as the statutory period 
was nearing its end, calling it a derivative work, and copyrighting it.”52  The 
court concluded that this was not an issue here because “[a] Spawn who talks 
medieval and has a knight’s costume would infringe Medieval Spawn, and if 
he doesn’t talk medieval and doesn’t look like a knight then he would in-
fringe Spawn.”53  It may seem trivial to point out that a Spawn who wears a 
costume would infringe Medieval Spawn, but this case is important because it 
lays out the test in the Seventh Circuit for when a fictional character is copy-
rightable and what is required for another character to be considered a deriva-
tive work from the original character. 
C.  Copyright Protection of Characters in Derivative Works 
Copyrightable works moving from one medium to another can produce 
complications with regard to when the copyright of each respective work 
begins and ends.  An important case on this issue is Warner Bros. Entertain-
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 657–58. 
 47. Id. at 660. 
 48. Id. at 661.  The court noted that the Lone Ranger actually does have a name – 
John Reid – but most of his audience is unaware of it.  Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 662. 
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ment, Inc. v. X One X Products from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit.54 
Warner Brothers is the owner of the registered copyrights to the 1939 
films The Wizard of Oz and Gone with the Wind.55  While the films were still 
in production, publicity materials were independently created featuring the 
characters in costume.56  These materials did not conform to the copyright 
notice requirements of the time, and so, the works were not protectable by 
federal copyright.57  X One X Productions and Art-Nostalgia.com, Inc. 
(“AVELA”), the defendant, extracted the images of the famous characters 
from the publicity materials and began marketing them on a host of consumer 
items and used them as models for various three-dimensional works.58 
Warner Brothers sued AVELA, alleging unfair competition and that the 
extracted images infringed the films’ copyrights and trademarks.59  AVELA 
argued correctly, according to the court, that as a general proposition, the 
public was allowed to freely use materials in the public domain, including in 
the creation of derivative works based off of the original.60  The caveat was 
that this right to freely modify the original work ends when the derivative 
work “comes into conflict with a valid copyright.”61  This means:  
[I]f material related to certain characters is in the public domain, but 
later works covered by copyright add new aspects to those characters, 
a work developed from the public domain material infringes the copy-
rights in the later works to the extent that it incorporates aspects of the 
characters developed solely in those later works.62   
In order to determine if copyright infringement has occurred, it is neces-
sary to determine the scope of the copyright in the later works, the scope of 
the materials in the public domain, and the scope of the derivative works cre-
ated from the materials in the public domain.63  The Eighth Circuit agreed 
with the district court’s conclusion that Dorothy, Tin Man, Cowardly Lion, 
and Scarecrow were all sufficiently distinctive to receive copyright protection 
from the film.64 
  
 
 54. See 644 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 55. Id. at 589. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 590. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 591, 596. 
 61. Id. at 596. 
 62. Id. at 597. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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The court came to the same conclusion in regard to the characters Scar-
lett O’Hara and Rhett Butler from Gone with the Wind.65  According to the 
court, AVELA correctly argued that the protection for the characters was 
limited to incremental changes of character expression that occurred when the 
characters were moved to the film from their respective books.66  This had 
little value in the instant decision because of the fact that a character as de-
scribed in a book “anticipates very little” of the character as it is expressed in 
the film.67  As an example, the court noted Dashiell Hammett’s description of 
Sam Spade, played by Humphrey Bogart in the 1941 film,68 from The Mal-
tese Falcon: 
Samuel Spade’s jaw was long and bony, his chin a jutting v under the 
more flexible v of his mouth.  His nostrils curved back to make anoth-
er, smaller, v. His yellow-grey eyes were horizontal.  The v motif was 
picked up again by thickish brows rising outward from twin creases 
above a hooked nose, and his pale brown hair grew down—from high 
flat temples—in a point on his forehead.  He looked rather pleasantly 
like a blond satan.69  
Warner Brothers noted that the court in Gaiman exclaimed that even af-
ter this description, hardly anyone would know what Sam Spade looked like, 
“[b]ut everyone knows what Humphrey Bogart looked like.”70  The actors’ 
portrayals of these characters “appear to rely upon elements of expression far 
beyond the dialogue and descriptions in the books.”71  AVELA failed to iden-
tify any instance where “the distinctive mannerisms, facial expressions, 
voice, or speech patterns” of an actor’s portrayal of a movie character were 
anticipated by that character’s description in the book.72  The court found that 
for both films, the only images in the public domain were the precise images 
contained in the original publicity materials.73 
The court then divided AVELA’s products into three categories, the first 
being the images or parts of images from the promotional materials that were 
transferred to new media, such as a lunch box.74  The court determined this 
category did not infringe the copyright of the movie because “Warner Bros. 
present[ed] no reasoned argument as to why the reproduction of one smaller 
contiguous portion of an image from an item of publicity material, rather than 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. The Maltese Falcon, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0033870/ (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
 69. Id. (quoting Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 70. Id. at 597–98 (quoting Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660–61). 
 71. Id. at 598. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 602. 
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the entirety of the image from that item, would add an increment of expres-
sion of the film character.”75  The second category consisted of products on 
which AVELA had juxtaposed one image from the publicity materials with 
either an image from somewhere else in those materials or with a phrase from 
the book.76  The court held that combining parts from materials in the public 
domain added a novel increment of expression that infringed the copyright of 
the corresponding movie.77  The third category consisted of three-
dimensional products that were created with the publicity materials.78  
AVELA indicated that its goal was to create products that the public would 
recognize as the film characters, so the court inferred that the details chosen 
to create three-dimensional perspective “were chosen to be consistent with 
the film characters.”79  Therefore, the court found, the inclusion of additional 
details that transformed the two-dimensional images into three-dimensional 
figures infringed the copyright of the characters in the film.80 
This case is important to copyright law because the Eighth Circuit in 
Warner Brothers lays out a very encompassing test for what constitutes a 
derivative work.  Under the rationale of this case, it seems that if part of a 
work remains copyrighted, it is very difficult to use any parts of the work in 
the public domain except in the exact format that the work was in when it 
entered the public domain. 
D.  Right of Publicity 
Copyright law can create a number of results that are unfavorable to ei-
ther the author or the public, so some attempts have been made to extend new 
areas of law, such as the right of publicity to fictional characters.81  In Cali-
fornia, “the right of publicity is both a statutory and a common law right.”82  
Originally, the codified right of publicity authorized the recovery of damages 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 603. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 604. 
 80. Id. 
 81. For more information about death and the right of publicity, see Erik W. 
Kahn & Pou-I “Bonnie” Lee, “Delebs” and Postmortem Right of Publicity, 
LANDSLIDE Vol. 8 No. 3 (2016).  For a more in depth analysis of the relationship 
between fictional characters and the right of publicity, see Jessica Joshua, Fictional 
Characters and the Right of Publicity: Policies, History, and Conflict (Dec. 2009) 
(unpublished seminar paper, Chicago-Kent College of Law), http://www.kentlaw.edu/
perritt/courses/seminar/papers%202009%20fall/jessica%20joshua%20Entertainment
%20Law%20Final%20Seminar%20Paper.pdf.  For more background, see generally 
Dawn H. Dawson, Note, The Final Frontier: Right of Publicity in Fictional Charac-
ters, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 635 (2001). 
 82. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001). 
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by any non-consenting living person who had their name, photograph, or 
likeness used for commercial purposes.83 
In 1984, the California legislature created a new statutory right of pub-
licity that echoed the previous right of publicity statutes but made the right 
descendible to the heirs and assignees of the deceased.84  In order for a de-
ceased person’s right of publicity to qualify under the California statute, it is 
necessary that the person’s “name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness 
has commercial value” at the time of death, regardless of whether the person 
used any of the features commercially while alive.85  This transferable right 
ceases when there is neither a transferee nor survivor, or after fifty years from 
the time of death, whichever occurs sooner.86 
In Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Comedy III was the regis-
tered owner of all rights to The Three Stooges, who were all deceased within 
the meaning of the statute.87  Saderup created and sold lithographs and T-
shirts depicting charcoal drawings of The Three Stooges.88  The Supreme 
Court of California stated that when an artist uses a celebrity’s literal depic-
tion or imitation for commercial gain without significant added expression, 
the state law interest is to protect the celebrity’s artistic labor over the inter-
ests of the imitative artist.89  The rights of the celebrity are not absolute under 
the right of publicity statutes; however, their likenesses are not protected for 
varying uses, such as sports or political commentary.90 
The right of publicity has extended into a transferable right and can pro-
tect the fictional personas of groups such as the Three Stooges.  The differ-
ences and similarities between fictional personas and fictional characters may 
be of significance later but even now there may be right of publicity connec-
tions to fictional characters when they are portrayed by actors.91  However, as 
far as the author is aware this right has not yet been extended to fictional 
characters in any jurisdiction.92 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 800 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(h) (West 2016)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 800–01. 
 89. Id. at 808. 
 90. Id. at 800. 
 91. See Hoffman, supra note 13.  For more information on actors, fictional char-
acters, and the right of publicity, see Patrick Kabat, From the Next Gen Committee: 
Rights of Publicity in Actor-Created Fictional Characters Whose Mask Is It Any-
ways?, LEVINE SULLIVAN KOCH & SCHULZ, LLP (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.lskslaw.com/documents/MLRC%20Aug.%202015%20(00882765).pdf. 
 92. Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01729-LB, 
2015 WL 5000102, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015). 
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III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
This Part explores the recent developments in the law surrounding fic-
tional characters and derivative works.  First, this Part examines Warner 
Brothers as applied in Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, which covers the issue 
of derivative works when part of a work is still under copyright protection 
and part of the work has entered the public domain.  Then, this Part analyzes 
the right of publicity and the push by one company to extend the right of pub-
licity to corporations.  Finally, this Part surveys the use of trademarks to pro-
tect fictional characters by examining DC Comics v. Towle and how trade-
mark protection protects the Batmobile. 
A.  Creating Derivative Works 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took a seemingly dif-
ferent approach to derivative works in the case of Klinger v. Conan Doyle 
Estate, an opinion written by Judge Posner and decided on June 16, 2014, 
than it did in Warner Brothers.93  The first Sherlock Holmes story was pub-
lished in 1887, and the last story written by Arthur Conan Doyle was pub-
lished in 1927.94  Altogether, Doyle published fifty-six stories and four novels 
about the adventures of Sherlock Holmes, with the last ten stories published 
between 1923 and 1927.95 
The CTEA extended the copyright duration of these stories to ninety-
five years after the original publication date, meaning that the copyright on 
these stories would expire between 2018 and 2022.96  However, the stories 
and novels published before 1923 have all entered the public domain.97  
Klinger created a canon of the Sherlock Holmes books written by Doyle, and 
although Klinger did not believe he needed a license, his publisher paid 
Doyle $5000 for a copyright license.98  Klinger and a co-editor then decided 
to create a sequel and entered into negotiations with a publisher and a distrib-
utor.99  The Doyle estate learned of the work in progress and informed the 
publisher that the book would require a license, subsequently threatening to 
use its contacts to prevent an unlicensed Sherlock Holmes story from being 
distributed through the major retailers.100 
Klinger then sued the Doyle estate, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
he could use the Sherlock Holmes material already in the public domain.101  
 
 93. See 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458 (2014). 
 94. Id. at 497. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 498. 
 101. Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit found that because the estate had threatened to block 
distribution of the book and there was a latent threat to sue for copyright in-
fringement, there was an actual controversy that created jurisdiction to hear 
the case.102  Doyle’s estate argued that the suit was premature because the 
work was not yet created, and therefore, it would be impossible to determine 
whether the work infringed.103   
The court determined that prematurity was not an issue in this case be-
cause Klinger’s question presented by the declaratory judgment was “whether 
he is free to copy the characters of Holmes and Watson as they are depicted 
in the stories and novels” that are in the public domain.104  The court stated 
that when a story enters the public domain, the story elements, including its 
characters, “become fair game” for other authors to use.105  The court then 
acknowledged the Warner Brothers case and the rule that the freedom to cre-
ate new derivative works utilizing material in the public domain ends where 
the resulting work comes into conflict with works that are still copyrighted.106  
The court then found that, in this case, there was no conflict with any deriva-
tive works and the protected material.107 
The Doyle estate argued that creativity would be discouraged if copy-
right protection was not extended in this case, but the court noted that this 
argument did not apply here, seeing as Doyle had been dead for eighty-four 
years.108  The court stated that extending copyright protection would result in 
less material available in the public domain, which would prevent subsequent 
authors from creating new stories about popular fictional characters.109  The 
court reasoned that extending copyright protection would also discourage 
creativity because this would encourage authors to write more stories about 
old characters, rather than create new stories about new characters.110  The 
estate advanced the hypothetical of a mural that was first drawn and then later 
painted, saying that an artist that made the sketch would have less incentive 
to perfect the mural if creative copiers had already improved it.111  The court 
responded that while allowing the sketch to enter the public domain would 
diminish the artist’s incentive to perfect the mural, it would incentivize others 
to improve it or create derivative works.112 
The Doyle estate advanced the idea of a test that revolved around 
whether a character was “flat,” or not fully developed, or “round,” meaning 
 
 102. Id. at 499. 
 103. Id. at 499–500. 
 104. Id. at 500. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 501 (quoting Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 
584, 596 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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fully developed.113  “Round” characters continue to evolve, and the estate 
argued that these characters are not rounded off until the final story.114  The 
Seventh Circuit found this argument unconvincing, suggesting that this ar-
gument would presumably allow original trilogy Star Wars characters to not 
expire until the copyrights of Episodes I, II, and III expire.115  The court 
acknowledged that the Doyle estate may be concerned that another author 
would disparage Sherlock Holmes, thereby discouraging others from reading 
the Doyle series; but, the court said this issue was essentially trademark dilu-
tion, which has “no comparable doctrine of copyright law.”116  The court 
rejected Doyle’s arguments and concluded by chiding the specter of what 
appeared to be a request for effectively perpetual copyright protection, total-
ing 135 years, when the Constitution only allowed such protection for a lim-
ited time.117 
B.  Right of Publicity 
Right of publicity lawsuits were traditionally only relegated to cases in 
which the rights of an actual person were potentially jeopardized, but recent 
suits have tried to expand the rights to other entities.  In Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony 
Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, Micro Virag owned VIRAG, an Italian company 
that “was founded in the 1960s as a carpet distributor, and it later expanded 
into the field of commercial floorings . . . .”118  Micro Virag sued several di-
visions of Sony for violating VIRAG’s common law right of publicity and 
trademark rights.119 
In 2004, VIRAG started sponsoring the Rally of Monza, which is held at 
a racetrack where the Formula One Italian Grand Prix is hosted.120  Sony 
develops, produces, and distributes the Gran Turismo racecar simulation 
games, which have sold over seventy million copies.121  Gran Turismo 5 and 
6 contain a simulation of the VIRAG mark on a bridge at the Rally of Monza 
racetrack.122  Sony did not attempt to obtain rights to VIRAG’s mark, and 
VIRAG has always denied any requests to sponsor other products with the 
use of their mark.123  Sony did receive authorization or license to use the 
marks of other trademark holders within the game.124  VIRAG alleged that 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 502. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 503. 
 117. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 118. Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, No. 3:15-cv-01729-LB, 
2015 WL 5000102, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at *2. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at *2–3. 
 124. Id. at *3. 
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Sony’s use of the VIRAG mark in the video games did cause and was likely 
to cause confusion regarding VIRAG’s sponsorship of the games.125 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed 
the claim that Sony violated VIRAG’s common law right of publicity be-
cause, under California law, corporations do not have a right of publicity.126  
The court also noted that no court “has held or even suggested that the right 
of publicity extends to non-human beings.”127 
The few courts that have heard similar arguments have rejected them.  
For example, in Eagle’s Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of California declined to extend the right of 
publicity to a corporation in 1985.128  This is the same conclusion reached by 
a Missouri court that also refused to extend the right of publicity to corpora-
tions in 1998.129  The court in Virag also analyzed the academic work of Pro-
fessor Thomas McCarthy, who is opposed to extending the right of publicity 
to anyone or anything that is not a real human being.130  Professor McCarthy 
clarifies that this belief extends to fictional and cartoon characters and lists 
Betty Crocker, the Jolly Green Giant, and Mickey Mouse as three characters 
undeserving of a right of publicity.131  Professor McCarthy believes that 
whatever exclusive rights these characters have should be found in copyright 
and trademark because he believes that right of publicity laws should only 
protect humans.132 
C.  Trademark Protection for Fictional Characters. 
In addition to the right of publicity, courts have wrestled with the issue 
of whether or not to extend trademark protection to fictional characters.  A 
trademark can consist of a word, phrase, symbol, and/or design that is used to 
identify the source of the goods of one party as distinguishable from all oth-
ers.133  Some fictional characters, such as Disney’s Pinocchio, are so identifi-
 
 125. Id. at *2. 
 126. Id. at *5–6. 
 127. Id. at *5. 
 128. Id. at *5 (citing Eagle’s Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 
856, 862 (E.D. Pa. 1985)). 
 129. Id. (citing Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1998)). 
 130. Id. (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND 
PRIVACY § 4:45 (2d ed. 2015)). 
 131. Id. at *6 (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 130). 
 132. Id. (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 130). 
 133. Trademark, Patent, or Copyright?, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basics/trademark-patent-
or-copyright (last updated Nov. 16, 2015). 
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able with the source that they are protected by trademark law even if the work 
in which they originated has entered into the public domain.134 
Another beloved character, Batman’s Batmobile, has recently been in-
volved in trademark and copyright litigation.135  Since 1941, Batman has pro-
tected Gotham City from villains utilizing his trusted Batmobile.136  The 
Batmobile is a high-tech automobile that has changed in appearance over the 
years but has always served as “Batman’s personal crime-fighting vehicle.”137 
In DC Comics v. Towle, Defendant Mark Towle produced and sold rep-
lica versions of the Batmobile as it appeared both in the 1966 television show 
and in the 1989 film for approximately $90,000 apiece.138  DC Comics, who 
owns the rights to the Batmobile, sued Towle for copyright infringement, 
trademark infringement, and unfair competition.139  The U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California found that the Batmobile was a charac-
ter, and as a character, it was subject to copyright protection.140  The district 
court relied on several findings including: 
[T]hat the Batmobile “is known by one consistent name that identifies 
it as Batman’s personal vehicle,” and, although some of its physical 
traits have changed over time, several have remained consistent, in-
cluding its “high-tech gadgets and weaponry,” “bat-like motifs,” and 
its jet black color.  Additionally, the district court found that the Bat-
mobile is always “depicted as being swift, cunning, strong and elu-
sive,” and is even portrayed as a “superhero” and “Batman’s sidekick, 
if not an extension of Batman’s own persona.”141 
The court granted summary judgment to DC Comics, finding that Towle 
had infringed DC’s copyrights.  The district court also found that Towle had 
intentionally used the term “Batmobile” to refer to his replicas and that this 
action was done in bad faith to associate his replicas with the Batman produc-
tions.142  Towle argued that the Batmobile changed appearance multiple times 
and sometimes even “appeared without its signature sleek ‘bat-like’ features,” 
but the court noted that a consistent appearance was not as significant as con-
sistent traits and attributes.143  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
 
 134. Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 874 (C.D. Cal. 
1986); Terms of Use, WALT DISNEY FAM. MUSEUM, http://waltdisney.org/terms-use 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
 135. DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1017. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1017–18 (quoting DC Comics v. Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d 948, 967 
(C.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d, 802 F.3d 1012). 
 142. Id. at 1018. 
 143. Id. at 1022. 
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cuit held that the question of whether or not the Batmobile was a copyrighted 
character was a question of law and affirmed the trial court’s findings.144 
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the trial court’s rulings with regard to 
the trademark infringement, finding that Towle used the Batmobile trademark 
in order to take advantage of the pre-existing value of the mark.145  The Ninth 
Circuit found that no reasonable juror could have concluded that Towle’s use 
of DC Comics’ trademarks were for any reason other than exploiting those 
marks.146 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
Copyright protection is still the primary method of providing protection 
for fictional characters, but the idea that copyright can protect the individual 
characters within a story is a relatively new one.  This Part analyzes the dif-
ferences that are emerging in the federal circuit courts of appeals and explores 
the methods of eliminating the conflict between providing incentives to au-
thors to produce new works and adding content to the public domain. 
A.  A Divergence in Districts 
The Klinger and Warner Brothers cases, although seemingly divergent, 
may still be capable of reconciliation.  Harmony can be achieved if the differ-
ences in the opinions are the result of the conclusion that the graphical and 
literary characters are treated differently.  Take the animated series Teenage 
Mutant Ninja Turtles, for example.  The comic books were first introduced in 
1984,147 and when the first comic book entered the public domain, there was 
still a large amount of material, including several animated and live film/TV 
adaptations, under copyright protection.  Under Klinger, once these charac-
ters enter the public domain, anyone would be able to write stories about 
them.148  Under Warner Brothers, anyone will be able to use Ninja Turtles 
material to create derivative works unless that work comes into conflict with 
a valid copyright.149  Warner Brothers held that the juxtaposing of two differ-
ent images that were otherwise in the public domain infringed on the copy-
 
 144. Id. at 1022–23. 
 145. Id. at 1026–27. 
 146. Id. at 1027. 
 147. Douglas C. McGill, Dynamic Duo: Kevin Eastman and Peter Laird; Turning 
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles Into a Monster, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1988), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/25/business/dynamic-duo-kevin-eastman-peter-
laird-turning-teenage-mutant-ninja-turtles-into.html?pagewanted=all. 
 148. See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458 (2014). 
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right of the film if the juxtaposition added a new increment of expression that 
was not present in the individual images.150 
So, under Warner Brothers, anyone would be free to create copies of the 
original Ninja Turtles comic book; but if they attempted to move the pictures 
around or create a new comic book depicting the identical characters, they 
might be infringing the copyright of the newer works that were still protect-
ed.151  If these two cases can be harmonized, then graphical works are seem-
ingly given more protection than literary works.  As a result, it would seem 
that, taken together, Klinger and Warner Brothers would allow others, upon 
expiration of the first copyright, to create literary works about the adventures 
of the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, but any attempt to modify or create new 
depictions of the Turtles from public domain images could result in copyright 
infringement of the newer works if a “new increment of expression” was 
added. 
Klinger rejects the notion that the copyrights on the characters as por-
trayed in the original Star Wars trilogy will expire only on expiration of the 
copyright for the later-released prequel trilogy.152  However, one question 
remains: How is this theory applied?  If copyright from the original series 
enters the public domain for R2-D2, then what rights does a new author 
have?  Under Warner Brothers, it would seem that a new author technically 
has the right to use the original images of R2-D2, but that the creation of any 
derivative works would almost certainly infringe the copyright of the subse-
quent prequel trilogy.153 
Klinger expressed hostility toward a nearly perpetual copyright duration 
of 135 years; however, this hostility may be the result of a failure to under-
stand the current intricacies of copyright law.154  For example, Alec Greven 
published his New York Times best-selling book How to Talk to Girls at age 
nine.155  At the time the book was published, Alec was expected to live an-
other sixty-seven years.156  If he lived to the age of his life expectancy, his 
work would end up being protected by copyright for over 137 years: two 
years longer than what the Doyle estate was requesting for its series.157  Alt-
hough most authors will not have such a long life expectancy, this example 
illustrates the fact that at least some circumstances where very popular works 
will be protected for over 135 years already exist.  In light of that fact, judi-
cial reluctance to extend copyright protection past 135 years ignores the reali-
 
 150. Id. at 603. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See Klinger, 755 F.3d at 502. 
 153. See Warner Bros., 644 F.3d at 596. 
 154. See Klinger, 755 F.3d at 503. 
 155. Mike Celizic, 9-Year-Old Author Reveals Secrets of Picking Up Girls, 
TODAY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2008, 9:55 AM), http://www.today.com/id/28049776/ns/today-
today_news/t/-year-old-author-reveals-secrets-picking-girls/#.VjIExrSjl8E. 
 156. Actuarial Life Table, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
STATS/table4c6.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
 157. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 503. 
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ty of the predicted copyright duration for works that are being created right 
now. 
The court in Klinger argues that extending copyright duration for works 
in a series will encourage authors to create stories about the same characters 
rather than creating new ones.158 Current copyright laws already protect 
works with a known author for life plus seventy years.159  If copyright protec-
tion is extended to the life of the author plus 200 years, will that really incen-
tivize an individual author such as J.K. Rowling to create more books about 
Harry Potter than she already otherwise would?160  When copyright protec-
tion originally only lasted for twenty-eight years, the argument would have 
been a lot stronger that an extension would incentivize the author to keep 
creating stories about the same characters so as to extend the copyright dura-
tion to the end of the author’s life.  But, the current copyright duration will 
always extend past the author’s lifetime, and so they will be able to reap the 
benefits of their copyrights as long as they are alive; this seems like all the 
motivation an author would need.161  At this point in time, it seems difficult 
 
 158. Id. at 501. 
 159. Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
 160. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248–49 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
 
In conjunction with official figures on copyright renewals, the CRS Report in-
dicates that only about 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old retain 
commercial value—i.e., still generate royalties after that time.  But books, 
songs, and movies of that vintage still earn about $ 400 million per year in roy-
alties.  Hence, (despite declining consumer interest in any given work over 
time) one might conservatively estimate that 20 extra years of copyright protec-
tion will mean the transfer of several billion extra royalty dollars to holders of 
existing copyrights -- copyrights that, together, already will have earned many 
billions of dollars in royalty “reward.” 
 
Id.   
 161. Id. at 254–55 (citations omitted). 
 
No potential author can reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance 
of writing a classic that will survive commercially long enough for the copy-
right extension to matter. After all, if, after 55 to 75 years, only 2% of all copy-
rights retain commercial value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more 
(a typical pre-extension copyright term)—must be far smaller.  And any re-
maining monetary incentive is diminished dramatically by the fact that the rel-
evant royalties will not arrive until 75 years or more into the future . . . .  Using 
assumptions about the time value of money provided us by a group of econo-
mists (including five Nobel prize winners), it seems fair to say that, for exam-
ple, a 1% likelihood of earning $ 100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years 
into the future, is worth less than seven cents today.  What potential Shake-
speare, Wharton, or Hemingway would be moved by such a sum?  What mone-
tarily motivated Melville would not realize that he could do better for his 
grandchildren by putting a few dollars into an interest-bearing bank account?  
The Court itself finds no evidence to the contrary. 
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to imagine that an author will be more likely to continue a story about the 
same characters just because copyright protection is extended ten generations 
beyond their death instead of three.162 
B.  Corporations as the Owners of Copyrights 
An exception to this inventive argument is when corporations act as au-
thors.  In 2012, Disney purchased the Star Wars franchise for over $4 billion 
with the intent to produce a new film every few years.163  Disney, as an im-
mortal entity that can collect revenue until judgment day, now has a lot of 
incentive to extend copyright protection to the Star Wars characters for as 
long a period of time as possible.164  Let us, for simplicity’s sake, assume that 
Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope is a work for hire that was published in 
1977, which would give the work copyright protection until 2072.165  Today, 
Disney still creates new works featuring the characters from this first movie, 
and Disney has indicated that it intends to continue to create Star Wars mov-
ies for the foreseeable future.166 
In this case, if Disney were able to extend the copyright protection of 
characters in the original trilogy by simply creating more works about those 
characters, it would seem clear that Disney has a tremendous incentive to do 
so.  Though, with Disney’s estimated budget of $200 million for the newest 
Star Wars film,167 it seems that Disney is not trying to create a new work 
simply to bolster the copyright protection of the earlier films.  What seems 
more likely is that consumer expectations drive the economic decision to 




 162. See id. at 254 (“And any remaining monetary incentive is diminished dramat-
ically by the fact that the relevant royalties will not arrive until 75 years or more into 
the future, when, not the author, but distant heirs, or shareholders in a successor cor-
poration, will receive them.”). 
 163. Alex Block, Disney to Buy Lucasfilm for $4.05 Billion; New ‘Star Wars’ 
Movie Set for 2015, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 30, 2012, 12:54 PM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/disney-buy-lucasfilm-405-billion-384448. 
 164. See Germain Lussier, 20th Century Fox Still Owns Rights to First Six ‘Star 
Wars’ Films, Making Original Box Set Difficult, /FILM (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://www.slashfilm.com/20th-century-fox-still-owns-rights-to-first-six-star-wars-
films-making-original-box-set-difficult/.  The original purchase of the Star Wars 
franchise was not completely straightforward as 20th Century Fox retained some 
rights to the franchise.  Id. 
 165. STAR WARS: EPISODE IV – A NEW HOPE (Lucasfilm 1977). 
 166. Ryan Nakashima, Disney to Make New ‘Star Wars’ Movies, Buy Lucasfilm 
for $4.05 Billion from George Lucas, YAHOO! FIN. (Oct. 30, 2012, 8:59 PM), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/disney-star-wars-films-buy-210830937.html. 
 167. Brent Lang, ‘Star Wars: The Force Awakens’: Counting Down the Records it 
Broke, VARIETY (Dec. 20, 2015, 11:14 AM), http://variety.com/2015/film/box-
office/star-wars-the-force-awakens-records-box-office-1201665770/. 
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Han Solo’s character may have been killed in Star Wars: Episode VII - 
The Force Awakens, but that does not mean that the character is not still ex-
tremely valuable.168  Disney is also creating a new Han Solo spin-off film that 
will come out in 2018.169  This film will feature a younger Han Solo, and it is 
possible that Disney will continue to make films about Han Solo for another 
hundred years.170  If the Han Solo copyright protection from the first movie 
ends in 2072, and the copyright protection for this new film ends in 2113, we 
now have a period of forty-one years where some aspects of the Han Solo 
character are in the public domain, while other parts of his character are still 
under protection.  During such time, it is foreseeable that other film producers 
might begin to create new films about Han Solo.  Trying to follow Klinger 
and Warner Brothers would make it almost impossible to determine whether 
any of these knock-off creations would violate Disney’s copyright on the 
protected work. 
The problem may be that neither Klinger nor Warner Brothers deal ex-
plicitly with the issue at hand.171  It is clear under established copyright law 
that the Han Solo character, as it originally appeared, will eventually be in the 
public domain.  However, under Warner Brothers, if the knock-off Han Solo 
were fashioned in such a way so as to cause the audience to think of the Han 
Solo in the remaining Disney movies, the knock-off Han Solo would violate 
Disney’s copyright.172 
If such is the case, then simply saying that the copyright on the Han So-
lo character has expired is a gross misstatement of the rights that Disney 
holds, because they have essentially been granted the exclusive license to 
create derivative works of the original piece.173  Consequently, the only right 
granted to the public is to reproduce Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope in 
the exact form that it was originally introduced.  Klinger is similarly unhelp-
ful to our Disney conundrum because the decision was arguably premature, 
seeing as the Sherlock Holmes work was not yet finished.174 
The takeaway from Klinger seems to be that if someone wants to create 
a work that is based in whole or in part on works in the public domain, and 
characters in that work are present in works that are still protected, the best 
thing the author can do is to seek a declaratory judgment if an actual contro-
 
 168. See STAR WARS: EPISODE VII – THE FORCE AWAKENS (Lucasfilm 2015). 
 169. Peter Sciretta, ‘Star Wars’ Han Solo Spin-Off Movie to be Directed by ‘The 
Lego Movie’ Directors, /FILMS (July 7, 2015), http://www.slashfilm.com/hah-solo-
spinoff-movie/. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 458 (2014); Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 
F.3d 584, 596 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 172. See Warner Bros., 644 F.3d at 604. 
 173. See id. at 602–03. 
 174. See Klinger, 755 F.3d at 501. 
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versy arises that his or her unfinished work will not infringe the materials that 
are still copyrighted.175 
C.  The Constitutional Limitations on Copyright Protection 
The Constitution only gives Congress the power to protect the works of 
authors for limited times;176 thus, in order for the characters in stories to be 
given perpetual protection, the Constitution must either be amended, or a new 
form of protection would need to be extended to such characters.  Copyright 
protection could be extended for a very long period of time, such as 500 
years, and it would still theoretically meet the limited times requirement.177  
But, there is no reason to think that even this duration would satisfy immortal 
entities such as Disney. 
However, there are two other potential methods that could be used to 
protect fictional characters: trademark protection or an expanded right of 
publicity for fictional characters.178  Trademark protection, though, would 
only protect characters that are identified with a brand and are actively used 
in commerce.179  This could be the reason that Disney now includes a seg-
ment of Steamboat Willie before each of its new films.180  The problem with 
trademark protection, though, is that it could only be used to protect a limited 
number of characters, and a company like Disney would need to have charac-
ters like Aladdin trademarked for a brand of chocolate chip cookies, for ex-
ample, or Simba as the trademark for a light company.  But creating new 
product lines just to create valid trademarks is far too cumbersome a process 
to warrant any serious consideration as a method of protecting fictional char-
acters on any sort of large scale.181 
Extending the right of publicity for fictional characters is accompanied 
by its share of problems.  The biggest problem with extending the right of 
publicity to fictional characters is that this form of protection was designed 
for real humans and is always tied to the life of the individual.182  As fictional 
 
 175. See generally id. 
 176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 177. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 197 (2003) (“[T]he CTEA’s terms, 
though longer than the 1976 Act’s terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore 
fit within Congress’ discretion.”). 
 178. See Kathryn M. Foley, Note, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining the 
Elusive Trademark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 921 (2009); Samuel J. 
Coe, Note, The Story of a Character: Establishing the Limits of Independent Copy-
right Protection for Literary Characters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1305, 1310 (2011). 
 179. Foley, supra note 178, at 940. 
 180. Beth Barany, Trademark Protection for Fictional Characters, WRITER’S FUN 
ZONE (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.writersfunzone.com/blog/2011/12/23/trademark-
protection-for-fictional-characters/. 
 181. See Foley, supra note 178, at 942. 
 182. Dawson, supra note 81, at 637. 
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characters are immortal, extending protection in this case would essentially 
be akin to creating a new form of intellectual property that has no duration. 
Extending copyright protection by expanding the duration of copyright 
is the most practical method of protecting complex fictional characters.183  
The question then presents itself: If the copyright duration was extended from 
ninety-five years to 150 years for corporate creations, what incentive would 
Disney have to create more films about Han Solo?  In the immediate future, 
this change does not seem to incentivize Disney to create any new movies 
about this character because its current copyrights on the character will not 
end for a very time.  However, what such a change might do is cause Disney 
to be willing to invest in new enterprises in light of the long period of time 
they will have to recoup their investment.  Disney surely considered the cur-
rent ninety-five-year duration when it acquired the rights to the Star Wars 
franchise for over $4 billion.184  This ninety-five period gives Disney a safety 
net that would only require them to earn $42 million a year to recover their 
investment, assuming that the ninety-five-year duration started at the time of 
acquisition and the last work acquired had just been published.185  The reality, 
though, is that Disney has far fewer years left of copyright protection for the 
previously published Star Wars works. 
The approach taken in Warner Brothers strikes a good balance for ex-
tending protection for humans, but it could become quite complex in the case 
of corporations.186  Under the Warner Brothers approach, corporations have 
an incentive to continue to create interesting stories about characters for as 
long as it remains financially viable to do so.187  In view of the tremendous 
amount of money invested in modern fictional works, it is foreseeable that 
most companies would actually utilize this opportunity to continue to create 
new and valuable works.  Conversely, the Doyle estate was just sitting on its 
rights, and this would likely be the approach taken by the estate of any human 
author.188  Companies, on the other hand, can continue to create high caliber 
works forever, to the continued amusement of their fans. 
 
 183. See Jasmina Zecevic, Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters That Con-
stitute the Story Being Told: Who Are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copy-
right Protection?, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 365, 396–97 (2006) (discussing rea-
sons why fictional characters should not be offered independent protection). 
 184. See Block, supra note 163. 
 185. In reality, this was a much better investment for Disney. because Star Wars: 
Episode VII – The Force Awakens grossing over $2 billion in the worldwide box 
office.  Sam Turner, Yes, Disney Will Keep Milking the Star Wars Cow, DESERET 
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2016, 7:55 AM), 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865651939/Yes-Disney-will-keep-milking-the-
Star-Wars-cow.html?pg=all. 
 186. See generally Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584 
(8th Cir. 2011). 
 187. See generally id. 
 188. See generally Lee, supra note 10. 
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D.  A Proposal for a Modified Copyright Rule 
A possible solution could be the following blanket rule: copyright pro-
tection extends to the characters of a story so long as there are works in the 
series that are still under copyright protection.  Under such a rule, as long as 
Disney keeps creating Star Wars movies about Han Solo, Disney would nev-
er suffer a production that depicts Han Solo in a manner that is contrary to 
canon.  Consequently, the loss to society might merely be that the public 
would never get to witness a version of the film in which Han Solo betrays 
the rebel alliance, or another in which Han aspires to become the greatest Jedi 
of all time.  If both Disney and hundreds of other companies are producing 
Han Solo movies, the market will become very complicated, very quickly.  If 
one of the knock-off derivative films features Han Solo wielding a light sa-
ber, then one of the official Disney movies could potentially end up infring-
ing if their Han Solo fights include even one battle with a light saber.  So, the 
issue becomes this: How much control should society extend to the owner of 
a copyrighted series?  It would seem that society might be more willing to 
give extended protection to a corporation that will continue to entertain by 
creating new works than to an estate that will just sit on the works already 
created. 
In order for a system like this to work, though, it is important that re-
straints be placed on the company to ensure that products are still being added 
to the marketplace.  One method of achieving this goal is, following the Han 
Solo example above, to start with the law that works of corporate authorship 
last ninety-five years.  After the end of this period, that work enters the public 
domain.  This would mitigate the concern that if the work never enters the 
public domain, then authors could continue to charge a premium for the work 
and restrict the poor from access to many classical works.189  The change 
would be that the company then receives the right to create derivative works 
based on the characters for a period of time, possibly twenty years. 
A short time period like this could be used to ensure that the company is 
not just sitting on its rights, but actively creating new content as a method of 
maintaining the rights to use the characters in derivative works.  This could 
theoretically be used by a company in order to preserve the rights to a charac-
ter such as Han Solo for eternity, so the constitutional limitation protecting 
copyrights only for a limited duration will arise.  There are two arguments 
that could be used to address this issue.  The first is that perpetual rights are 
not being given, but rather copyright extensions to create derivative works.190  
Each respective original and derivative work would still enter into the public 
domain after ninety-five years but the right to build on those works would be 
maintained by the company.  So, even if the protection is classified as copy-
 
 189. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 190. See Joshua H. Warmund, Development Agreements Are Vital to Prevent 
Disputes over Proprietary Interests in Web Sites, 74-DEC N.Y. ST. B.J. 34, 35 
(2002). 
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/13
2016] COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 653 
right protection, it is not perpetual protection but rather finite extensions that 
can be granted an infinite number of times so long as certain conditions are 
met. 
The second argument is that the protection that is being extended to the 
company is not copyright protection but rather a temporarily exclusive li-
cense to create derivative works.191  This argument is supported by the fact 
that the original copyright protection laws only extended to the right to print, 
publish, and vend the book or pamphlet.192  This idea would still be followed 
in the new regime where the author loses those rights at the end of the ninety-
five-year period.  What the author then is maintaining is the right to create 
derivative works, which is a concept that was not extended to American cop-
yright law until the Act.193  It could be the case that such a right to create 
derivative works is not governed by copyright protection as laid out in the 
Constitution but is instead simply a right that is now provided to authors 
along with copyright protection.194 
The loss to society in granting companies the exclusive right to create 
derivative works will shrink the public domain because other authors will not 
be able to build upon characters such as Han Solo or Harry Potter.  The pub-
lic will be able to build upon the stock characters, though, and the only reason 
that an author would want to utilize the previously copyrighted characters is 
to build on the success of the original authors.  Requiring them to create their 
own characters in fact encourages these new authors to be more creative than 
simply telling a new story with existing characters previously originating 
from another mind. 
In essence, this new system would provide balance to the struggle be-
tween copyright protection and the public domain.  Authors would be en-
couraged to create new, exciting works about existing characters as long as 
they have an interesting story that the public will support by buying movie 
tickets, books, or other methods.  The original works will all enter the public 
domain so they can be enjoyed by anyone, but the rights to modify the works 
will be curtailed only as long as the author is actively developing the charac-
ters.  This means that a company like Disney will eventually have to let some 
characters enter the public domain for logistical reasons.   
As the number of complex characters in the Star Wars movies exponen-
tially increase, it will become impossible for the company to continue to cre-
ate new works utilizing all of the characters and still make it profitable to do 
so.  The rights to some of these characters will then lapse and the public will 
be free to make derivative works with them.  In order to make sure the com-
pany is not just sitting on its rights like the Doyle estate, laws could be estab-
 
 191. See id. at 35–36. 
 192. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). 
 193. Copyright Act of 1976, ch. 17, § 103, 90 Stat. 2541 (as originally enacted) 
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012)). 
 194. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
25
Uptegrove: Copyright Protection
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
654 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
lished that prevent the derivative rights extension from applying in cases 
where the characters are licensed to other entities. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is nothing to suggest that companies will not continue to lobby for 
longer and longer copyright protection in order to protect their fictional char-
acters.  If companies are able to keep extending the copyright duration of the 
works they have already created, there are strong arguments that the public 
would be deprived because it does not have access to these works that would 
otherwise be free or very inexpensive.195  A suitable compromise should be 
struck that provides companies with a way to protect the works in which they 
have invested so much money, but where the work will eventually enter the 
public domain.   
Granting companies a renewable license to create derivative works 
through their continued creative efforts while leaving the copyright duration 
for each work of corporate authorship at ninety-five years seems to be a suit-
able compromise.  This will incentivize companies to continue to create pop-
ular derivative works while still granting each work to the public after a fixed 
amount of time.  This would mean that Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope 
and all of the subsequent films would enter the public domain after ninety-
five years but Disney could still have the exclusive right to create Han Solo 
movies for a set period of time from the last time they created a Han Solo 
work.  These subsequent Han Solo films would also enter the public domain 
after ninety-five years, but the exclusive license to create Han Solo films 
would continue as long as Disney continued creating works about the charac-
ter.   
During the brief history of the United States, copyright duration has al-
most quadrupled works of corporate authorship,  and if we continue on this 
trajectory, it will not be long before copyright duration exceeds several hun-
dred years.  This solution seeks to stop this expansion of copyright duration 
by protecting the characters in works that the authors actually cares about in 
exchange for the author continuing to create works around the characters they 
care about.  This will ensure that all works enter the public domain where 
they can be enjoyed by all. 
 
 
 195. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 250 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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